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Chief, Far Eastern Division

14 November 1950

Chief, Northern Branch

CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 326

REFERENCE: General Headquarters, Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section,
General Staff Letter of 14 October 1950.

Much of 1. Intelligence Memorandum (IM) 326 represents an O/RE estimate, as distinguished from a compilation of basic intelligence reports, on the North Korean military supply situation. O/RE based its estimate on an analysis of all reports and information available from such field reports as FEAFF Operations Reports, CIA Reports and FEC Daily Intelligence Summaries. Studies by War Department ID and previous studies prepared by several divisions in O/RE were also exploited. It should be noted that while a large part of this information was included in FEC Daily Intelligence Summaries, many of the pertinent Summaries were received after the original drafting of the IM and the preparation of the map. The information included in the draft and map was originally received by CIA in cabled field reports.

2. B/No has never been informed of any necessity for CIA to footnote its intelligence production, either current intelligence, staff studies or National Intelligence. It would be extremely difficult to determine two months after the publication of a study the precise sources used in the paper since individual words and phrases were not "lifted" from individual reports. Rather O/RE production is a composite picture derived from many sources. It should be pointed out that portions of the FEC Daily Intelligence Summary's coverage on Korea comes from CIA sources. If the practice of footnoting were instituted, CIA would be faced with the problem of whether to credit the original or secondary source.

3. CIA agrees that the problem of "false verification" is a serious one from the point of view of producing periodic summaries. It must be pointed out, however, that the problem does not arise in the production of estimates. If the FEC's position were to be adhered to categorically all estimates, even National Intelligence Estimates, would require credit footnoting.

4. Relative to the footnote on coordination, CIA estimates utilize all available information and all feasible working level coordination, consultation and agreement is effected in every case. This normal procedure was followed in the preparation of IM-326. The footnote in question is a standard one and merely indicated that the IAC Agencies concerned had not taken formal coordinating action on the estimate as a whole and did not imply any lack of working level consultation or inter-agency exchange of information.

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